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ABSTRACT
Before the advent of sophisticated international nancial markets, a widely accepted belief was that
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necessary to provide adequate insurance against country-speci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result holds in a wide variety of settings. Finally, we establish that an activist union-wide authority
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A monetary union sets union-wide monetary policy in the hope of achieving desirable out-
comes. When a monetary union is established, a classic question arises: How should the
scal policies of member countries be coordinated? In particular, is it desirable to estab-
lish a union-wide authority to coordinate the scal policies of member countries as well as
to implement international scal transfers between them? Amid the recent debate about
the desirability of greater scal integration within the European Union, such a question has
regained center stage.
Before the advent of sophisticated international nancial markets, a widely accepted
belief was that within a monetary union, a union-wide authority orchestrating scal transfers
is desirable to provide adequate insurance against country-specic macroeconomic shocks.
In this paper, we examine whether the need for such an authority to provide cross-country
insurance has decreased as international nancial markets have become more developed. In
short: Can international nancial markets substitute for a scal union?
One view, associated with Mundell (1973), is that sophisticated international nancial
markets are su¢ cient to provide insurance against country-specic economic uctuations.
Mundell illustrated this point using a simple example in which the world consists of two
islands: Capricorn, which is south of the equator and produces its crops in the fall, and
Cancer, which is north of the equator and produces its crops in the spring. Both countries
are subject to random uctuations in their crop output, and goods can be stored only for six
months. Mundell explains how, even with labor immobile across countries, well-developed
insurance markets can achieve the same outcomes that would be achieved if labor were per-
fectly mobile and individuals migrated every six months to the island in which crops can
be grown. In short, in Mundells view, international nancial markets can provide all the
necessary cross-country insurance, thereby obviating the need for a scal union to implement
any transfer.
An alternative view, associated with Kenen (1969), is that transfers between regions of
a monetary union are critical to its functioning. Specically, Kenen argues that in a currency
union, the domain of scal policy ought to coincide with the currency area(Kenen 1969, p.
46). In this essay, Kenen also explains how a well-functioning scal union entails large-scale
transfers between countries in the face of country-specic economic uctuations.
In this paper, we argue that the key di¤erence between Mundells and Kenens views
of international transfers can be traced back to their distinct ideas of what a union-wide
authority should accomplish. FromMundells point of view, the role of a union-wide authority
is simply to provide insurance to member countries, whereas from Kenens point of view, the
role of such an authority also entails performing an ex-ante redistribution of wealth, say,
from richer countries to poorer countries in a union. Our main result is that under Mundells
view, the advent of sophisticated nancial markets obviates the need for any such authority
to provide international transfers, whereas under Kenens view, such a union-wide authority
should play an active role even in the presence of sophisticated nancial markets.
We consider several settings for policy. In our benchmark setting, member countries
policies are rich enough that countries can correct all their domestic distortions. We then
investigate a restricted policy setting in which member countriespolicies are symmetrically
constrained in a way that prevents them from resolving all their domestic distortions. In both
settings, we nd support for Mundells view: if the role of a union-wide authority is simply to
provide insurance and its only instruments are transfers between countries, then there is still
no need for it to play an active role. In particular, restrictions on member countriespolicies
do not create a scal externality, whereby each country adopts a policy that is optimal for
that country but is suboptimal for the union as a whole.
We derive our result under ve main assumptions: i) all countries are small in the rel-
evant sense, ii) the union-wide authority and member countries can commit to their policies,
iii) the union-wide authority has no advantage over national governments in its choice of
policy instruments, iv) the government of each country maximizes the welfare of its citizens,
and v) the union-wide authority maximizes a Pareto-weighted sum of countriesutilities, with
weights that ensure that the union-wide authority is only concerned with providing insurance
to member countries rather than with redistributing wealth. If we dispense with any of these
assumptions, a role for an active union-wide authority emerges.
We illustrate this point by considering three settings that relax some of these assump-
tions. First, we allow the union-wide authority to have access to instruments that some of
the national governments do not have available. In particular, we envision a more powerful
union-wide authority that, in addition to its ability to impose international transfers, can
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levy portfolio taxes on each member countrys international nancial transactions. This ex-
pansive view of a union-wide authoritys powers goes well beyond the limited role envisioned
for it by Mundell, but is consistent with the role envisioned for it by Kenen. In this setting,
when the policies of member countries are restricted in various ways, it is typically optimal
for the union-wide authority to intervene by levying portfolio taxes on the countries facing
policy restrictions. The rationale for this intervention, however, is not specically to improve
cross-country insurance, but rather to help ameliorate domestic distortions in countries that
are unable to do so on their own.
The results from this rst setting might lead one to conjecture that the need to levy
portfolio taxes is intimately connected to the restrictions on policy that arise from countries
belonging to a monetary union. Our second setting shows that this conjecture is incorrect:
if national governments face constraints on their policies, then the union-wide authority
typically has an incentive to intervene and impose portfolio taxes even when countries have
exible exchange rates.
In the settings considered so far, equilibrium outcomes, except for international trans-
fers, are invariant to whether a given policy is delegated to national governments or to the
union-wide authority. Our third setting is one in which this irrelevance of delegation of au-
thority result no longer holds. In this case, we allow for self-interested governments that
maximize objective functions that are di¤erent from those of their citizens. We also allow
governments to choose government spending that only benets themselves. We think of this
environment as capturing the idea that for a whole host of reasons, including political ones,
some governments are unwilling to pursue policies that are most desirable for their citizens.
We show that in this scenario, it is better to delegate the power to levy portfolio taxes to a
union-wide authority rather than to national governments.
These three settings generate a role for an active union-wide authority. All of them,
however, clearly have a paternalistic avor: a responsible and powerful union-wide author-
ity should provide remedial help to member countries, that is, should intervene only when
member countriesgovernments are either unable or unwilling to pursue desirable policies.
In our analysis, we closely follow Farhi and Werning (2013), henceforth FW, by con-
sidering a simple one-period economy with a continuum of countries, each of which produces
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traded and nontraded goods. The nontraded goods sector consists of a continuum of monop-
olistically competitive intermediate goods rms that produce di¤erentiated products. The
prices of these rms are sticky in that they must be set before the realization of preference
and productivity shocks. The traded goods sector is competitive and has exible prices. This
economy builds on Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) and is a special case of Gali and Monacelli
(2005, 2008).
Even though we purposely adopt the setup of FW in our analysis, we arrive at very
di¤erent conclusions. The key di¤erence between our work and that of FW is that we build
in, as part of Mundells view, the idea that the goal of a union-wide authority is simply to
provide insurance rather than to redistribute ex-ante wealth, whereas FW presume that a
union-wide authority is also concerned with redistribution over and above insurance.
Our benchmark scal policies grant each government a payroll tax on labor income,
excise taxes on nontraded goods, portfolio taxes, and domestic transfers, whereas restricted
scal policies disallow the use of nontraded goods taxes. This restriction adds an extra con-
straint on each governments problem, which one might conjecture could give rise to scal
externalities. The scal union features three tiers of decision makers. At the top tier, a union-
wide authority chooses international transfers between countries to maximize a weighted sum
of the welfare of consumers in each country. At the middle tier, the governments of all
countries, taking as given international transfers set by the union-wide authority, noncooper-
atively choose their countriesscal policies, or simply national policies, in order to maximize
the welfare of the consumers of their countries. At the bottom tier, consumers and rms in
each country, taking as given both the policies of the union-wide authority and the national
governments, make production and consumption decisions.
We begin by studying the need for a scal union when each national government
has access to the benchmark scal policies. We start with an incomplete market setting that
captures in a stark way the idea that before the modern era of international nancial markets,
cross-country insurance could only be provided through direct cross-country transfers. As
both Mundell and Kenen agree, in such an era there is a clear need for an active union-wide
scal authority.
We then consider a setting with complete international nancial markets. We think of
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this complete market setting as capturing the idea that, in the modern era of sophisticated
international nancial markets, countries can rely on these markets to obtain cross-country
insurance. We show that with complete markets, a union-wide scal authority is unnecessary
if and only if this authority is concerned solely with providing insurance to member countries.
That is, under Mundells view of the role of a scal authority, complete markets ensure that
the optimal amount of insurance is obtained, whereas under Kenens view, a scal authority
is still needed to accomplish any ex-ante wealth redistribution between member countries.
We then investigate whether, once we restrict the scal instruments of national gov-
ernments, a scal externality arises across countries that necessitates an activist union-wide
authority. That is, we repeat our previous exercise, now with restricted policies, to determine
whether the policies that governments choose to pursue are ine¢ cient from the viewpoint of
the union as a whole. Our key result is that no scal externality arises in this case: even
though national governments are unable to correct all their domestic distortions, they still
pursue policies that are optimal for the union. Thus, even here, we nd that a union-wide
scal authority is unnecessary with complete markets if and only if this authority is concerned
solely with insurance among countries in the union.
We then turn to identifying circumstances under which it is optimal for a union-
wide authority uninterested in redistribution to pursue an activist role in scal policy. For
simplicity, we consider a setting in which one group of countries in the union, called the North,
optimally sets traditional scal instruments, that is, payroll and nontraded goods taxes, but
the other group, called the South, is unable (or unwilling) to use nontraded goods taxes. We
think of this setup as capturing the idea that the South has poorly functioning governments.
We equip the union-wide authority with portfolio taxes that it can levy on any country in
the union, and show that it is optimal for the union-wide authority to impose portfolio taxes
only on Southern countries. By doing so, the authority raises the welfare of all countries in
the union by partially o¤setting the distortions that the Southern countries are unable to
correct on their own.
Of course, if we allowed countries to have exible exchange rates, they could use their
domestic monetary policies to o¤set country-specic shocks, and there would be no need for
an activist union-wide authority. This result may lead one to think that, more generally,
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the only reason why the union-wide authority would take an active role in policy is that
countries cannot use their domestic monetary policies to o¤set country-specic shocks. To
show that this reasoning is incorrect, we consider a scal union with exible exchange rates
but assume that Northern countries have access only to portfolio taxes, whereas Southern
countries again have imperfectly functioning governments in that they are unable to levy
any taxes. The union-wide authority can levy portfolio taxes on any country in the union.
We show that in this case, the union-wide authority plays an active role by levying portfolio
taxes on Southern countries. As before, though, doing so does not correct any macroeconomic
externality; rather it simply helps Southern countries ameliorate their domestic distortions.
So far, we have assumed that national governments are benevolent in that they max-
imize the welfare of their citizens. Under this assumption, an irrelevance of delegation of
authority result holds: the equilibrium is unchanged if any of the labor taxes, nontraded
goods taxes, or portfolio taxes are delegated to the national governments or the union-wide
authority. Our last economy shows that if, instead, national governments pursue their own
self-interests, then the union as a whole typically has an incentive to delegate powers, such as
portfolio taxes, to a benevolent union-wide authority rather than to the national governments.
Our analysis implies that even when governments have only restricted scal instru-
ments available, no scal externalities arise. A key feature of our model behind this nding
is that governments have the power to commit to their scal policies once and for all. By
doing so, we abstract from the scal externalities that result from lack of commitment when
national scal policies are set noncooperatively. These issues are the focus of the work of
Chari and Kehoe (2007, 2008) and have recently been revisited by Aguiar et al. (2013), who
draw the same conclusions as Chari and Kehoe (2007, 2008) do.
1. A Currency-Fiscal Union with Incomplete Financial Markets
Here we set up a model of a joint currency-scal union with incomplete international nancial
markets. This model is meant to capture a setting in which international nancial markets
cannot provide adequate insurance across countries against country-specic macroeconomic
shocks. For simplicity, we make the extreme assumption that no international nancial
markets exist.
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Throughout, we distinguish between transfers motivated by insurance reasons and
transfers motivated by redistributive reasons. To this end, we are interested in transfers
that respect private ownership, that is, transfers that are optimal when the union-wide scal
authority uses a Pareto weight for each country that, at the appropriately dened shadow
prices, does not involve an ex-ante redistribution of wealth from one country to another, say,
from ex-ante richer countries to ex-ante poorer countries.
The timing of the economy involves three stages, which reect the three-tiered struc-
ture of decision making discussed earlier. At the rst stage, the union-wide authority moves
and sets international transfers. At the second stage, taking as given the decisions of the
union-wide authority, national governments set their national scal policies noncooperatively.
At the third stage, taking as given the policies set in the previous stages, consumers and rms
in each country make their production and consumption decisions. It is convenient to both
set up and solve for the overall equilibrium, referred to as the world equilibrium, by working
backwards from the end of the period. We therefore start with the bottom tier.
A. Bottom Tier: Competitive Equilibrium
We start by laying out the economy and dening a competitive equilibrium, given the union-
wide and national policies chosen at higher tiers.
The economy lasts one period, features a continuum of countries i 2 I = [0; 1] that
belong to a currency union, and is adopted from FW. The uncertainty in the economy is
represented by a nite set of states s 2 S with (s) denoting the probability of state s. This
uncertainty a¤ects preferences and technology. Each consumer in country i has preferences
over nontraded goods, CiN(s), traded goods, C
i
T (s), and labor, L
i(s), given by
(1)
X
s
(s)U i(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s); s):
Trade of state-contingent assets in domestic asset markets between consumers in country i
takes place before the state s is realized, subject to the asset market constraint
(2)
X
s
Qi(s)Di(s)  0.
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In each state s, a consumer also faces a budget constraint given by
(3) [1 +  iN(s)]P
i
NC
i
N(s) + PT (s)C
i
T (s)
 W i(s)Li(s) + PT (s)

Y iT (s) + T
i(s) + T iI(s)

+ i(s) + [1   iD(s)]Di(s):
All prices are expressed in units of a common currency, say, euros. Here Qi(s) is the price at
the beginning of the period for the delivery of one euro in state s, P iN(s) is the country-specic
price of nontraded goods, and PT (s) is the union-wide price of traded goods. Consumers in
country i have endowments of traded goods Y iT (s), elastically supply labor, L
i(s), to produce
nontraded goods at a nominal wage of W i(s), and receive nominal prots i(s) from the
ownership of nontraded goods rms. Consumers take as given the policies of their national
governments, namely, the tax rate on the purchases of nontraded goods in state s,  iN(s), the
tax rate on domestic assets,  iD(s), and the domestic transfers, T
i(s), as well as the policies
of the union-wide scal authority, namely, the international transfers, T iI(s). Throughout,
domestic and international transfers are in units of traded goods.
The rst-order conditions for the consumers problem imply that for all states s,
(4) i = (s)
U iT (s)[1   iD(s)]
PT (s)Qi(s)
;
(5)
U iT (s)
PT (s)
=
U iN(s)
[1 +  iN(s)]P
i
N
;
(6)  U
i
L(s)
U iT (s)
=
W i(s)
PT (s)
;
where i is the multiplier on the asset market constraint (2). Here all asset trade is domestic
in that
(7) Di(s) = 0 for all i and s.
In each country i, competitive nontraded nal goods rms buy di¤erentiated varieties of
nontraded goods from intermediate producers, combine them into nal goods, and sell them
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to consumers in country i. These rms solve
(8) max
fCi;jN (s)g

P iNC
i
N(s) 
Z 1
0
P i;jN C
i;j
N (s)dj

;
subject to CiN(s) =
hR 1
0
Ci;jN (s)
" 1
" dj
i "
" 1
, where " is the elasticity of substitution among
varieties, P iN is the price of the aggregate bundle of goods, and P
i;j
N and C
i;j
N (s) are the price
and quantity of variety j in country i at state s. This problem generates a downward-sloping
demand curve for each variety j,
(9) Ci;jN (s) =
 
P i;jN
P iN
! "
CiN(s):
The intermediate goods producers are monopolistically competitive and have sticky prices in
that they set their prices before the realization of the state, s. The producer of variety j in
country i produces goods with the technology Ci;jN (s) = A
i(s)Li;j(s) and charges the price
P i;jN , where L
i;j(s) is the amount of labor employed by this producer. The prots in state s
of such an intermediate goods producer are
(10) i;j(s) = P i;jN C
i;j
N (s) 
 
1 +  iL

W i(s)Li;j(s);
where  iL is a payroll tax on the labor hired by these rms. The price is chosen to maximize
the value of prots,
(11) max
P i;jN
(X
s
Qi(s)

P i;jN  
 
1 +  iL
W i(s)
Ai(s)
 
P i;jN
P iN
! "
CiN(s)
)
;
where we have substituted the production technology and the demand function into (9) in
the expression for prots in (10). The resulting optimal price is given by
(12) P i;jN = (1 + 
i
L)
"
"  1
P
sQ
i(s)W
i(s)
Ai(s)
CiN(s)P
sQ
i(s)CiN(s)
;
which is a markup over a weighted average of the marginal cost of labor across states. Notice
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that the price of each variety j in country i is the same and equal to the right side of (12)
and, thus, so are the choices for output and labor, that is, P i;jN = P
i;j0
N , C
i;j
N (s) = C
i;j0
N (s), and
Li;j(s) = Li;j
0
(s) for all j and j0. Clearly, the price of each variety j thus equals the aggregate
price index, P iN , the output of each variety equals the aggregate quantity of nontraded goods,
CiN(s), and the labor hired by each producer j in country i is independent of j and can be
written as Li(s).
Consider now the national policies of country i. The policies of country is government
are summarized by i = fi(s)g, where i(s) = ( iL;  iN(s);  iD(s); T i(s)). For each s, the
government budget constraint requires that domestic transfers equal domestic tax revenues,
(13) PT (s)T i(s) =  iLW
i(s)Li(s) +  iN(s)P
i
NC
i
N(s) + 
i
D(s)D
i(s).
The government collects revenues from the payroll tax, the tax on the consumption of non-
traded goods, and the portfolio tax, and rebates these revenues to its consumers in a lump-sum
fashion.
The policies of the union-wide authority are international transfers, T iI = fT iI(s)g. The
budget constraint of this authority species that international transfers across countries sum
to zero in each state s,
(14)
Z
i
T iI(s)di = 0:
Notice that here the union-wide authority transfers resources directly to consumers rather
than to national governments.
Formally, let X = fX ig, with X i = fX i(s)g and X i(s) = (CiT (s); CiN(s); Li(s); Di(s)),
denote the allocations in country i, P = fP ig, with P i = fP i(s)g and P i(s) = (P iN ;W i(s)),
and Q = fQig, with Qi = fQi(s)g, denote the domestic prices in country i, and  = fig
denote national policies. Let PT = fPT (s)g denote the world prices of traded goods, and let
TI = fT iIg, with T iI = fT iI(s)g, denote the international transfers to country i.
Given the policies of the union-wide authority, fT iIg, and the national policies, fig,
a competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets consists of world prices, PT , together with
allocations, fX ig, and domestic prices, fP ig and fQig, for each country i such that: i)
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consumer maximization in each country i holds, ii) prot maximization for both nal goods
rms and intermediate goods rms in each country i holds, iii) the national policy, i, satises
the government budget constraint of each country i, (13), iv) the union-wide policies, fT iIg,
satisfy the budget constraint of the union-wide authority, (14), v) all asset trade is domestic
in the sense that (7) holds, and vi) the nontraded goods market-clearing condition holds for
each country i,
(15) CiN(s) = A
i(s)Li(s) for all s;
and the world traded goods market-clearing condition holds,
(16)
Z
i
CiT (s)di =
Z
i
Y iT (s)di for all s:
We will show that in an equilibrium with incomplete markets, the conditions above imply a
country i market-clearing condition for traded goods,
(17) CiT (s) = Y
i
T (s) + T
i
I(s) for all s.
The following lemma characterizes the set of allocations that can be implemented in such an
equilibrium.
Lemma 1. The allocations in a competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets sat-
isfy the nontraded and world traded goods market-clearing conditions, namely, (15) and (16).
Moreover, given any allocations that satisfy these constraints, we can construct prices and
policies for each country that, together with the given allocations, constitute a competitive
equilibrium with incomplete markets.
Proof. For necessity, by denition of an equilibrium, the allocations satisfy nontraded
and traded goods market clearing. For su¢ ciency, given some allocations, we construct prices,
policies, and asset holdings as follows. Clearly, there is one degree of nominal indeterminacy
in the construction of nominal good prices, which we resolve by setting PT (s0) = 1 for some
particular state s0. To see there is also some indeterminacy in the setting of nontraded goods
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taxes,  iN(s), note that (5) implies
(18)
U iT (s)=U
i
N(s)
U iT (s0)=U
i
N(s0)
=
PT (s)[1 + 
i
N(s0)]
1 +  iN(s)
:
We uniquely pin down PT (s) by picking a country, say, i = 0, and setting  0N(s) = 0 for all
s. Doing so gives
(19) PT (s) =
U0T (s)=U
0
N(s)
U0T (s0)=U
0
N(s0)
:
Given PT (s), however, (18) makes clear that for each country i 6= 0, there is still one degree
of indeterminacy in nontraded goods taxes. To resolve this indeterminacy, we pick a state,
say, s0, and set  iN(s0) = 0 for all i. Then, using PT (s0) = 1 and 
i
N(s0) = 0 for all i; from
(5) we obtain
(20) P iN =
U iN(s0)
U iT (s0)
:
Then, using  iN(s0) = 0 and (18) gives that the tax on nontraded goods for a country i 6= 0
is given by
(21) 1 +  iN(s) =
U iT (s0)=U
i
N(s0)
U iT (s)=U
i
N(s)
PT (s);
and from (6) wages are given by
W i(s) =  U
i
L(s)
U iT (s)
PT (s);
where PT (s) is given by (19).
There is also one degree of nominal indeterminacy in asset prices. We resolve this
indeterminacy by setting Qi(s0) = 1. There is clearly also a joint indeterminacy in Qi(s) and
 iD(s). We resolve it by letting Q
i(s) = Q(s) for all i and s, setting  0D(s) = 0 for all s, and
 iD(s0) = 0 for all i 6= 0. Now, using these normalizations, we can divide (4) for country 0
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evaluated at state s by this same equation for country 0 evaluated at state s0 to obtain
(22) Q(s) =
1
PT (s)
(s)U0T (s)
(s0)U0T (s0)
;
where PT (s) is given by (19). Now, for i 6= 0, dividing (4) for states s and s0 and then using
our normalizations and the expression for Q(s) in (22) implies that portfolio taxes are given
by
(23) 1   iD(s) =
U iT (s0)
U iT (s)
U0T (s)
U0T (s0)
:
Given P iN , W
i(s), and Qi(s), the payroll tax  iL is set so that (12) holds. Domestic transfers
are determined by the government budget constraint, and international transfers are given
by
(24) T iI(s) = C
i
T (s)  Y iT (s):
To see that such transfers are consistent with the consumer and government budget con-
straints, combine these budget constraints and substitute for prots from (10) with Di(s) = 0
to obtain (24). To see that such transfers are consistent with the union-wide constraint on
international transfers, integrate (24) over countries and use world market clearing in traded
goods, (16), to obtain (14). Q:E:D:
We summarize our normalizations here: we set PT (s0) = 1,  0N(s) = 0 for all s,
 iN(s0) = 0 for all i, Q
i(s0) = 1, Qi(s) = Q(s) for all i and s,  0D(s) = 0 for all s, and
 iD(s0) = 0 for all i.
Note that the competitive equilibrium is dened for each possible setting of union-wide
and national policies, (TI ; ). As will become clear below, in what follows it is best to think of
the competitive equilibrium as the continuation equilibrium of the noncooperative equilibrium
of the second stage among national governments for given union-wide policies. That is, we
can think of the competitive equilibrium as specifying allocation functions, X(TI ; ), a world
price function, PT (TI ; ), and domestic price functions, P (TI ; ) and Q(TI ; ), that vary with
union-wide and national policies, (TI ; ). Noncooperative national governments will use these
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maps to forecast how outcomes change as they vary their national policies.
B. Middle Tier: Noncooperative Equilibrium between National Authorities
Consider now the middle tier. Taking as given the decisions of the union-wide scal au-
thority, national governments set their policies noncooperatively. The policy for country is
government, i = fi(s)g, with i(s) = ( iL;  iN(s);  iD(s); T i(s)), consists of taxes on labor,
the consumption of nontraded goods, and asset holdings, and of transfers. The strategy of
country is government, i(TI), depends on the history it faces, which, in this three-tiered
decision-making structure, simply consists of the union-wide transfers, TI , chosen at the top
tier.
For any given set of union-wide policies, TI = fT iIg, a noncooperative equilibrium of the
incomplete market economy consists of strategies (TI) = fi(TI)g for national governments,
together with world price function, PT (TI ; ), and allocation and domestic price functions for
each country, fX i(TI ; ); P i(TI ; ); Qi(TI ; )g, where  = fig, such that: i) given the union-
wide policies, TI , and the national policies of every other country j 6= i, denoted  i(TI), the
national policy of any country i, i = i(TI), maximizes the welfare of country is consumers,
and ii) for every (TI ; ), the world price function, the allocation functions, and the domestic
price functions form a competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets.
The noncooperative equilibrium outcomes associated with these strategies are (T^I),
PT (T^I ; (T^I)), and fX i(T^I ; (T^I)); P i(T^I ; (T^I)); Qi(T^I ; (T^I))g, where T^I is the optimal pol-
icy of the union-wide authority. The noncooperative equilibrium should be thought of as
simply the continuation of the world equilibrium for a given set of union-wide policies.
Consider the notion of perfection built into this noncooperative equilibrium denition.
As the government of country i contemplates alternative policies, ~i, it anticipates that the
resulting prices and allocations, PT (TI ; ~) and fX i(TI ; ~); P i(TI ; ~); Qi(TI ; ~)g, with ~ =
(~i;  i(TI)), form a competitive equilibrium. Specically, given the structure of the world
economy, as the government of country i changes its policies, consumers and rms in country
i change their production and consumption decisions, domestic prices change but, because
country i is small in the world economy, all other countriesnational policies, allocations,
and domestic prices are unchanged. That is, since the world price of traded goods, PT (TI ; ~),
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with ~ = (~i;  i(TI)), is invariant to ~i, given the union-wide transfers TI , the government
of country i just faces a given world price function, say, PT = PT (TI ;  i(TI)).
We now show how this feature of equilibrium simplies the problem of country is
government. Using logic standard in the primal approach to optimal policy, we can think
of national governments as choosing policies, allocations, and domestic prices for country is
consumers and rms, subject to the conditions of the competitive equilibrium of the third
stage. Formally, the problem of the government of country i can be written as follows: taking
as given international transfers, T iI , and traded goods prices, PT = PT (TI ;  i(TI)), choose
country is allocations, prices, and policies to solve
(25) V i(T iI) = maxfXi(s);P i(s);Qi(s);i(s)g
X
s
(s)U i(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s); s);
subject to consumer and rm rst-order conditions in country i, the consumer and government
budget constraints in country i, and country is market-clearing conditions in nontraded (15)
and traded goods (17), where PT = PT (TI ;  i(TI)) in the consumer and government budget
constraints. 1 We claim that the best-response problem of a noncooperative government can
be reduced to a simpler form, that is,
(26) V i(T iI) = maxfCiN (s);CiT (s);Li(s)g
X
s
(s)U i(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s); s);
subject to nontraded goods market clearing,
(27) CiN(s)  Ai(s)Li(s) for all s;
and a country-wide budget constraint,
(28) CiT (s)  Y iT (s) + T iI(s) for all s:
Note that since there are no international nancial markets, the government of country i
1Here, and throughout the paper, we follow the primal approach in assuming that if there are multiple
equilibria associated with its policies, a government can select the best one.
15
realizes that there is no choice in the consumption of traded goods: consumers in country i
simply consume their endowment plus international transfers of traded goods.
Lemma 2. In an economy with incomplete markets, for any international transfers,
TI , and strategies of other governments,  i(TI), the best response of the government of
country i gives rise to allocations that solve (26).
Proof . The constraints facing the government of country i are summarized by the
consumer budget constraint, (3), the rst-order conditions for consumers, (4), (5), and (6),
the market-clearing condition for domestic assets, (7), the rst-order condition for nontraded
goods rms, (12), the government budget constraint, (13), and the nontraded and traded
goods market-clearing conditions, (15) and (17).
We rst show that an allocation that is feasible for the government must satisfy (27)
and (28) for country i. First, (15) is the same as (27), since (27) holds as an equality.
Second, to see how the constraint (28) arises, substitute in the consumer budget constraint
the expression for prots, i(s) = P iNC
i
N(s) (1 +  iL)W i(s)Li(s), the expression for domestic
transfers, T i(s), using the government budget constraint, (13), and Di(s) = 0 from (7). After
canceling terms, we obtain PT (s)CiT (s)  PT (s) [Y iT (s) + T iI(s)], which is equivalent to (28).
Now, given any allocations that satisfy (27) and (28), we can construct national policies and
national prices as we did in Lemma 1 so that the rest of the constraints are satised. Q:E:D:
To develop some intuition for why a noncooperative governments problem can be
reduced to a country-specic Ramsey-type problem, note that each country i is small and,
hence, the domestic allocations, prices, and policies chosen by the government of this country
cannot have an impact on world prices. Moreover, the policy choices of the countries in the
rest of the union only a¤ect a given country indirectly through traded goods prices, which
are set competitively.
Lemma 2 makes it clear that, given the vector of international transfers for each
country, fT iIg, world prices, PT , and the maximizing behavior of the government of country
i, the resulting utility of country i only depends on the international transfers to country i.
Thus, Lemma 2 establishes the precise sense in which no scal externalities across countries
exist.
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C. Top Tier: World Equilibrium
The union-wide authority chooses international transfers to maximize a weighted sum of
consumersutility in each country, that is, to solve
(29) max
fT iIg
Z
i
iV i(T iI)di
subject to
(30)
Z
i
T iI(s)di = 0 for all s:
Notice that the union-wide authority predicts that as it changes its transfers, the noncooper-
ative governments will alter their policies, and thus the associated prices and allocations, so
that the solution to (26) arises as a noncooperative equilibrium. In particular, for every set of
transfers ~TI it contemplates, the union-wide authority predicts that the national governments
will choose policies ( ~TI) consistent with a noncooperative equilibrium.
A world equilibrium with incomplete markets is a set of union-wide transfers, TI , strate-
gies for national governments, together with the world price function, and allocation and do-
mestic price functions for each country, such that: i) the union-wide transfers, TI , are optimal
for the union-wide authority, and ii) the strategies for national governments, together with
the world price function, allocation functions, and domestic price functions for each country,
form a noncooperative equilibrium.
This notion also has a type of perfection built into it: as the union-wide authority
contemplates alternative transfers, ~TI , it understands that national governments will best
respond to each such set of transfers using ( ~TI) and the resulting competitive equilibrium
allocations and prices will be those consistent with ~TI and ( ~TI).
Using standard primal logic, we can think of the union-wide authority as choosing
all policies, allocations, and prices subject to two sets of conditions.2 The rst set are all
the rst-order conditions of consumers and rms, the budget constraints of consumers and
2Here, as is standard in the primal approach, if there are multiple continuation equilibria for a given set
of policies, we implicitly let both the union-wide authority and the national governments select the best such
equilibrium.
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governments, and the market-clearing conditions that dene the competitive equilibrium.
The second set are the optimality conditions for the policies of each governments best-
response problem. Notice that since the consumption of traded goods is pinned down by the
endowment of traded goods and international transfers, the only optimality conditions from
the governments best-response problem are for nontraded goods and labor. Substituting
the constraints (27) and (28), holding as equalities, into the objective function (26), these
rst-order conditions for nontraded goods and labor reduce to
(31) Ai(s)U iN(s) + U
i
L(s) = 0.
If allocations satisfy (28) and the union-wide authority chooses international transfers
that satisfy (30), then the union-wide authority is only constrained by the nontraded and
world traded goods market-clearing conditions, along with the rst-order conditions in (31).
Now consider a relaxed version of the authoritys problem, where we substitute out all the
policies and drop the rst-order condition (31), which arises from (26). This relaxed problem,
referred to as the union-wide problem, is
(32) max
fCiN (s);CiT (s);Li(s)g
Z
i
i
"X
s
(s)U i(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s); s)
#
di
subject to
(33) CiN(s)  Ai(s)Li(s) for all s;
(34)
Z
i
CiT (s)di 
Z
i
Y iT (s)di for all s:
We claim that it is immediate that the solution to this relaxed problem has rst-order con-
ditions that are consistent with the dropped rst-order condition (31) of the governments
best-response problem. Moreover, policies and prices can be constructed so that a solution
to this relaxed problem satises the rest of the dropped constraints of the original problem.
Hence, the solution to the relaxed problem coincides with the solution to the original problem.
We summarize this discussion as follows.
18
Lemma 3. The allocations in the world equilibrium with incomplete markets solve the
union-wide problem (32).
2. A Currency-Fiscal Union with Complete Financial Markets
Here we consider a joint currency-scal union with complete international nancial markets.
We think of this complete market setting as capturing the idea that in the modern era of
international nancial markets, countries can access these markets to obtain cross-country
insurance. We again work backwards from the end of the period, starting from the competitive
equilibrium.
A. Bottom Tier: Competitive Equilibrium
We begin with a denition of a competitive equilibrium. Given the policies of the
union-wide authority, fT iIg, and the national policies, fig, a competitive equilibrium with
complete markets consists of world prices, PT and Q, together with allocations, fX ig, and
domestic prices, fP ig, for each country i such that: i) consumer maximization in each country
i holds, ii) prot maximization for both nal goods rms and intermediate goods rms in
each country i holds, iii) the national policy, i, satises the government budget constraint
of each country i, (13), iv) the union-wide policies, fT iIg, satisfy the budget constraint of the
union-wide authority, (14), v) the world asset market clears in that
(35)
Z
i
Di(s)di = 0 for all s;
and vi) the nontraded and world traded goods markets clear in that
(36) CiN(s) = A
i(s)Li(s) for all i and s;
(37)
Z
i
CiT (s)di =
Z
i
Y iT (s)di for all s.
Note that with complete markets, there is now one world asset market rather than separate
domestic asset markets. Given complete markets, any vector of international transfers to
country i, namely, T iI = fT iI(s)g, with the same present value is equivalent from the per-
spective of both the consumers and the government of country i. Thus, in dening a world
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equilibrium, there will be an indeterminacy in international transfers because any two sets of
transfers, fT iI(s)g and f ~T iI(s)g, are equivalent if they satisfy
X
s
Q(s)PT (s)T
i
I(s) =
X
s
Q(s)PT (s) ~T
i
I(s);
for given Q(s) and PT (s). We resolve this indeterminacy by representing international trans-
fers as a constant transfer across states, T i;cI , such that T
i
I(s) = T
i;c
I for all s. Here, as earlier,
we can think of equilibrium as specifying allocation functions, X(T cI ; ), world price functions,
PT (T
c
I ; ) and Q(T
c
I ; ), and domestic price functions, P (T
c
I ; ), that vary with union-wide
and national policies, (T cI ; ). The proof of the following lemma is nearly identical to that of
Lemma 1 and is left to the reader.
Lemma 4. The allocations in a competitive equilibrium with complete markets sat-
isfy the nontraded and world traded goods market-clearing conditions, namely, (36) and (37).
Moreover, given any allocations that satisfy these constraints, we can construct prices, poli-
cies, and asset holdings for each country that, together with the given allocations, constitute
a competitive equilibrium with complete markets.
B. Middle Tier: Noncooperative Equilibrium between National Authorities
Consider now the middle tier. As before, taking as given the decisions of the union-wide
authority, national governments set their policies noncooperatively. For any given set of
union-wide policies, T cI = fT i;cI g, a noncooperative equilibrium of the complete market econ-
omy consists of strategies (T cI ) = fi(T cI )g for national governments, together with world
price functions, PT (T cI ; ) and Q(T
c
I ; ), and allocation and domestic price functions for each
country, fX i(T cI ; ); P i(T cI ; )g, where  = fig, such that: i) given the union-wide policies,
T cI , and the national policies of every other country j 6= i, denoted  i(T cI ), the national
policy of any country i, i = i(T cI ), maximizes the welfare of country is consumers, and ii)
for every (T cI ; ), the world price functions, the allocation functions, and the domestic price
functions form a competitive equilibrium with complete markets.
Using logic similar to that used before, the best response of a noncooperative govern-
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ment can be reduced to a simpler form, that is,
(38) V i(T i;cI ) = maxfCiN (s);CiT (s);Li(s)g
X
s
(s)U i(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s); s);
subject to nontraded goods market clearing,
(39) CiN(s)  Ai(s)Li(s) for all s;
and a country-wide budget constraint,
(40)
X
s
Q(s)PT (s)C
i
T (s) 
X
s
Q(s)PT (s)

Y iT (s) + T
i;c
I

;
where PT = PT (T cI ;  i(T
c
I )) and Q = Q(T
c
I ;  i(T
c
I )). Here, as earlier, we use the property
that world prices do not vary with the policies of country i.
Lemma 5. In an economy with complete markets, for any international transfers, T cI ,
and strategies of other governments,  i(T cI ), the best response of the government of country
i gives rise to allocations that solve (38).
Proof . The proof follows closely that of Lemma 2 with a few exceptions. The con-
straints facing the government of country i are the same as in Lemma 2 except that the asset
market-clearing condition (7) is replaced by (35). To see that a feasible allocation for the
government must satisfy the country-wide budget constraint (40), substitute in the consumer
budget constraint the expression for prots, i(s) = P iNC
i
N(s)   (1 +  iL)W i(s)Li(s), the
expression for domestic transfers, T i(s), from the government budget constraint, (13), and
cancel terms, to obtain PT (s)CiT (s)  PT (s)

Y iT (s) + T
i;c
I

+Di(s). Then, multiply this con-
straint for each s by the world asset price Q(s), sum across states, and use the asset market
constraint (2) to arrive at (40).
Now, given any allocations that satisfy (39) and (40), we can construct national policies
and national prices so that the rest of the constraints are satised. Here country i takes as
given the world prices, Q(s) and PT (s). Given these prices, we proceed as in Lemma 1, by
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using the normalizations  iD(s0) = 0, Q(s0) = 1; and PT (s0) = 1 so that (4) implies
(41) 1   iD(s) =
(s0)
(s)
U iT (s0)
U iT (s)
Q(s)PT (s)
and let (41) determine  iD(s). (In contrast to Lemma 1, where we also constructed world
prices, here we only characterize the best response of a government given these prices.) The
rest of the argument follows analogously to that in Lemmas 1 and 2. Q:E:D:
C. Top Tier: World Equilibrium
A world equilibrium with complete markets is a set of union-wide transfers, T cI , strategies
for national governments, together with world price functions, and allocation and domestic
price functions for each country, such that: i) the union-wide transfers, T cI , are optimal for
the union-wide authority, and ii) the strategies for national governments, together with the
world price functions, allocation functions, and domestic price functions for each country,
form a noncooperative equilibrium.
As before, using standard primal logic, the union-wide authority can be thought of
as choosing all the policies, allocations, and prices subject to two sets of conditions. The
rst set are all the rst-order conditions of consumers and rms, the budget constraints of
consumers and governments, and the market-clearing conditions that dene the competitive
equilibrium of the third stage. The second set are the optimality conditions for the policies of
each governments best-response problem. Now consider a relaxed version of this authoritys
problem, where we substituted out all the policies and dropped the rst-order conditions of
national governments that arise from the rewritten governments problem (38). This relaxed
problem has the form
(42) max
fCiN (s);CiT (s);Li(s)g
Z
i
i
"X
s
(s)U i(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s); s)
#
di
subject to
CiN(s)  Ai(s)Li(s) and
Z
i
CiT (s)di 
Z
i
Y iT (s)di for all s:
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Clearly, we can construct prices Q(s) and PT (s) and international transfers so that the solu-
tion to this relaxed problem has rst-order conditions that are consistent with the rst-order
conditions of each governments best-response problem in (38). Moreover, these prices and
policies can be constructed so that a solution to the relaxed problem satises the rest of the
dropped constraints of the original problem. Thus, the solution to the relaxed problem is a
solution to the original problem. In sum, we have established the following result.
Lemma 6. The allocations in the world equilibrium with complete markets solve the
union-wide problem (42).
Note that the union-wide problem with complete markets coincides with that with
incomplete markets. The intuition is that with incomplete markets, appropriately chosen
union-wide transfers exactly mimic the risk-sharing payments made under complete markets.
Moreover, in the world equilibrium with complete markets that decentralizes these allocations,
portfolio taxes are not used. To see why, note that the solution to the union-wide problem
implies complete risk sharing in that
(43) iU iT (s) = 
0U0T (s) for all i and s.
Dividing this condition by its analog in state s0 gives that allocations with complete risk
sharing satisfy
(44)
U iT (s)
U iT (s0)
=
U0T (s)
U0T (s0)
for all i and s.
Now, consider the decentralized equilibrium. With complete international nancial markets,
which imply Qi(s) = Q(s) for all i, the rst-order condition (4) implies that
(45)
[1   iD(s)](s)U iT (s)
[1   iD(s0)](s0)U iT (s0)
=
[1   0D(s)](s)U0T (s)
[1   0D(s0)](s0)U0T (s0)
= Q(s)PT (s);
where we have used the normalizations that Q(s0) = PT (s0) = 1. Clearly, the allocations
that satisfy (44) can be supported as competitive allocations with  iD(s) = 0 for all i and s.
In this sense, portfolio taxes are redundant given nontraded goods taxes.
More generally, if we dropped the portfolio tax from the list of instruments a govern-
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ment controls, then we would obtain the same results as we did earlier, including Lemmas
3 and 6. To see why, consider rst the economy with complete markets and note that if we
endow governments only with a payroll tax and a nontraded goods tax, then the allocations
that solve the best-response problem for noncooperative governments would also solve (38).
To understand this result, note that with  iD(s) = 0 for all i and s, dividing the rst-order
condition (4) in a given country i for state s by the corresponding one for state s0 gives that
allocations must satisfy the extra constraint
(46)
(s)U iT (s)
(s0)U iT (s0)
= Q(s)PT (s) for all s 6= s0:
This constraint would then need to be added to the best-response problem, (38). To see that
this extra constraint is superuous, consider a relaxed version of this problem without the
constraint in (46). The rst-order conditions to the relaxed problem then imply (46), so the
solution to the relaxed problem is feasible for the original problem with this constraint and
hence solves it. It is thus immediate that the union-wide problem is unchanged. A similar
argument holds with incomplete markets. Portfolio taxes are not used in Lemma 2, so Lemma
3 would also hold without portfolio taxes. Then, the union-wide problem with incomplete
markets would be unchanged if we dropped portfolio taxes.
3. Do Financial Markets Obviate the Need for a Fiscal Union?
We have argued that the key di¤erence betweenMundells and Kenens views of a union
is that Mundell envisions a union in which international transfers are motivated solely by
insurance reasons, whereas Kenen imagines a union in which these transfers are motivated by
redistributive reasons as well. To formalize these di¤erent views, we need to distinguish clearly
a unions goal of providing insurance to member countries from its goal of redistributing ex-
ante wealth.
Given our setup with self-interested consumers and governments acting on behalf of
their own citizens, obviously no government will willingly give away ex-ante wealth. Hence,
regardless of how sophisticated international nancial markets are, if the goal of a union is
to redistribute ex-ante wealth, a union-wide authority is needed to extract ex-ante resources
from one group of countries and redistribute them to another. That is, under Kenens view,
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an activist union-wide authority is necessary to implement such a redistribution.
We claim that the key di¤erence between Mundells and Kenens views of a union
amounts to di¤erent specications of the Pareto weights used by the union-wide authority
when deciding on international transfers. Specically, for an arbitrary set of welfare weights,
 =

i
	
, a union-wide authority both provides insurance and redistributes ex-ante wealth.
To focus on insurance only, we proceed as follows. For any given set of weights, we construct
our decentralization of the allocations from the union-wide problem in the incomplete market
equilibrium, (32), as in Lemma 1, with articial prices Q(s;) and PT (s;) and associated
consumption levels fCiT (s;)g. The international transfers that decentralize this problem are
dened by
(47) T iI(s;) = Y
i
T (s)  CiT (s;);
that is, T iI(s;) are the transfers in state s given to each consumer in country i when the
union-wide authority uses the Pareto weights . Under the decentralization of this problem,
these transfers have an ex-ante value of
(48) W iI() =
X
s
Q(s;)PT (s;)T
i
I(s;):
We say that the weights  involve no ex-ante transfer of wealth between countries if
(49) W iI() = 0 for all i 2 I:
We say that a union-wide scal authority is concerned solely with insurance if its objective
function has Pareto weights that involve no ex-ante transfer of wealth between countries, and
has redistributive motives otherwise.
In short, according to Mundells view, in the incomplete markets era, the union-wide
authority has weights that satisfy (49). Given these weights, we then address Mundells
question: In the modern era of complete markets, is there any role for an activist union-wide
policy of transfers? More precisely, we say that the union-wide scal authority is unnecessary
with complete markets if the allocations in the world equilibrium in which this authority
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implements international transfers coincide with those in the world equilibrium in which all
international transfers are restricted to zero. That is, letting T i;cI () denote the equilibrium
transfers under complete markets, the union-wide authority is unnecessary if T i;cI () = 0 for
all i. The following is our rst main proposition.
Proposition 1. (Complete Markets Obviate the Need for a Fiscal Union) A union-
wide scal authority is unnecessary with complete markets if and only if this authority is
concerned solely with insurance.
Proof . Recall that the problem of the union-wide authority with incomplete markets
reduces to the same problem as it does with complete markets. Accordingly, we start with
the allocations that a union-wide authority would choose to implement with a system of in-
ternational transfers when markets are incomplete. We then show that these same allocations
would arise in an equilibrium with complete markets with no intervention by the union-wide
authority, as long as the union-wide authority is concerned solely with insurance.
The problem of the union-wide authority with incomplete markets reduces to the one
in (32). Let fCiT (s;)g and Q(s;) denote the traded goods allocations and the articial
prices for this problem. The rst-order conditions imply perfect risk sharing in that
(50) iU iT (s;) = 
0U0T (s;) for all i and s;
which yield
(51)
U iT (s;)
U iT (s0;)
=
U0T (s;)
U0T (s0;)
for all i and s:
Using the decentralization in Lemma 1, we obtain
(52) PT (s;) =
U0T (s;)=U
0
N(s;)
U0T (s0;)=U
0
N(s0;)
and Q(s;) =
1
PT (s;)
(s)U iT (s;)
(s0)U iT (s0;)
;
where (51) and (52) imply that Q(s;) does not vary with the country i. The transfers are
(53) T iI(s;) = Y
i
T (s)  CiT (s;);
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that is, T iI(s;) are the transfers in state s given to each consumer in country i when the
union-wide authority uses the Pareto weights . These transfers involve no ex-ante transfer
of wealth between countries if
(54) W iI() =
X
s
Q(s;)PT (s;)T
i
I(s;) = 0 for all i:
Now consider the problem of the union-wide authority with complete markets. As we
have argued, that problem reduces to (42) and thus its solution implies the same allocations
equal to fCiT (s;)g as those implied by the problem in (32). We can decentralize these
allocations as we did in Lemma 4. Clearly, the prices that decentralize these allocations
as a complete market equilibrium equal the prices that decentralize them as an incomplete
market equilibrium. The state-uncontingent transfers T i;cI () under the complete market
decentralization are related to the state-contingent transfers T iI(s;) under the incomplete
market decentralization by
(55) T i;cI ()
X
s
Q(s;)PT (s;) =
X
s
Q(s;)PT (s;)T
i
I(s;):
Thus, for the weights  that involve no ex-ante transfer of wealth under incomplete markets,
namely, those that satisfy (49), the complete market transfers necessarily satisfy
(56) T i;cI () = 0 for all i:
Thus, (56) establishes that a union-wide scal authority is unnecessary with complete markets
if and only if this authority is concerned solely with insurance. Q:E:D:
4. Do Restrictions on Policies Generate Fiscal Externalities?
So far we have considered economies in which national governments have available rich enough
scal instruments that the distortions associated with monopoly power, sticky prices, and a
xed exchange rate can be eliminated by a suitable choice of policies. Thus, with such in-
struments and complete markets, each national government can maximize its citizenswelfare
subject only to a country-wide budget constraint and the nontraded goods resource constraint.
27
Here we consider economies in which national governments have a restricted set of scal
instruments available so that they cannot eliminate all private distortions. The question we
address is the following: Does restricting the set of scal instruments of national governments
introduce a scal externality across countries? That is, with restricted policy instruments, is
a union-wide scal authority necessary to achieve the relevant constrained-e¢ cient outcomes?
Our answer is no: even with restricted instruments, no scal externality arises and, thus, a
union-wide scal authority is unnecessary if the authority is concerned solely with insurance.
A. Restrictions on Policies
Here we restrict governments to have no domestic policy instrument that a¤ects the
relative prices of traded and nontraded goods, that is, we make the restricted policy assump-
tion that
(57)  iN(s) = 0 for all i and s.
We again proceed by working backwards from the end of the period. To characterize the
set of allocations that can be implemented by a suitable choice of policy, consider the rst-
order conditions of consumers in (4)(6) and the intermediate goods rms in (12) under
the restricted policy assumption. We claim that in addition to the resource constraints,
these allocations must satisfy some additional constraints that we refer to as incomplete tax
constraints. To see how these constraints arise, note that with  iN(s) restricted to zero and
the normalization that PT (s0) = 1, the rst-order condition (5) implies
(58)
U iT (s)=U
i
N(s)
U iT (s0)=U
i
N(s0)
= PT (s);
where the right side does not vary across countries.3 Thus, the left side of (58) must be
the same across all countries i for any given state s. Letting Ri(s)  U iT (s)=U iN(s), we can
3Of course, if exchange rates were exible so that each country had its own nominal price of traded goods,
P iT (s), then even with 
i
N (s) restricted to zero, the right side of this rst-order condition would vary with i
and there would be no such restriction.
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compactly express these constraints relative to some particular country, say, i = 0, as
(59)
Ri(s)
Ri(s0)
=
R0(s)
R0(s0)
for all i and s:
Hence, for each country i 6= 0, there is one constraint per state s 6= s0. Here we discuss how
these incomplete tax constraints change the analysis in the incomplete and complete market
economies.
B. Incomplete Markets with Restricted Policies
We again proceed with each tier. A competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets
and restricted policies is dened analogously to that of our economy with unrestricted in-
struments. The lemma characterizing the competitive equilibrium is the analog of Lemma
1.
Lemma 7. The allocations in a competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets and
restricted policies satisfy the nontraded and world traded goods market-clearing conditions,
namely, (15) and (16), and the incomplete tax constraints (59). Moreover, given any allo-
cations that satisfy these constraints, we can construct prices and policies for each country
that, together with the given allocations, constitute a competitive equilibrium with incomplete
markets and restricted policies.
Proof. For necessity, by denition of an equilibrium, the allocations satisfy the non-
traded and world traded goods market-clearing conditions. To see that they must also satisfy
the incomplete tax constraints, divide each term in (5) for some state s by its counterpart in
state s0, imposing  iN(s) = 
i
N(s
0) = 0 to get
(60)
Ri(s)
Ri(s0)
=
PT (s)
PT (s0)
:
To see that (60) implies (59), pick state s0 to be state s0 and divide (60) for country i by the
same constraint for country 0. This yields (59). For su¢ ciency, the construction follows the
same steps as in Lemma 1. Q:E:D:
As for the middle tier, given the policies of the union-wide authority, TI = fT iIg, a
noncooperative equilibrium of the incomplete market economy is dened as before except
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that the domestic price functions form a competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets
and restricted policies. We claim that it is immediate from Lemma 7 and the denition
of the noncooperative equilibrium that the best response of country is government implies
allocations that solve
(61) V i(T iI) = maxfCiT (s);Li(s)g
X
s
(s)U i(Ai(s)Li(s); CiT (s); L
i(s); s);
subject to a country-wide budget constraint,
(62) CiT (s)  Y iT (s) + T iI(s) for all s,
and the incomplete tax constraints,
(63) Ri(s) = PT (s)Ri(s0) for s 6= s0;
which follows from (58), with PT (s0) = 1 and PT = PT (TI ;  i(TI)). The reason a govern-
ments best response solves this problem is that, taking as given the union-wide policy fT iIg
and the strategies  i(TI) of other governments, the government of country i can manipulate
its national policies to implement any allocation that satises (62) and (63). Notice that
with restricted instruments, the constraints in (63) imply that we can no longer reduce this
best-response problem to one in which all the traded goods prices have been substituted out,
as we did earlier with unrestricted instruments. The presence of these extra constraints,
(63), clearly introduces additional distortions into this problem relative to the one with an
unrestricted tax system. Here, the incomplete tax constraints typically bind when countries
face di¤erent shocks. Hence, the analog of Lemma 3 is immediate.
Lemma 8. The allocations in the world equilibrium with incomplete markets and
restricted policies solve the union-wide problem of maximizing the objective function in (32),
subject to the resource constraints for nontraded goods, the world resource constraints for
traded goods, and the incomplete tax constraints in (59).
For any given set of weights  =

i
	
, for the proof of this lemma we construct our
decentralization of the solution to the union-wide problem for the incomplete market economy
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with restricted instruments as in Lemma 1, with prices fQi(s;)g and associated consumption
levels fCiT (s;)g. The international transfers that decentralize this problem satisfy (47).
C. Complete Markets with Restricted Policies
The analysis here is an immediate extension of our analysis above. The key lemma for
the competitive equilibrium is the analog of Lemma 7.
Lemma 9. The allocations in a competitive equilibrium with complete markets and
restricted policies satisfy the nontraded and world traded goods market-clearing conditions,
namely, (15) and (16), and the incomplete tax constraints (59). Moreover, given any allo-
cations that satisfy these constraints, we can construct prices, policies, and asset holdings
for each country that, together with the given allocations, constitute a competitive equilibrium
with complete markets and restricted policies.
Given the world prices PT and Q and the (state-uncontingent) international transfers
T i;cI , the problem of the noncooperative government of country i is to choose allocations to
maximize the welfare of country i, that is,
max
fCiT (s);Li(s)g
X
s
(s)U i(Ai(s)Li(s); CiT (s); L
i(s); s)
subject to
X
s
Q(s)PT (s)C
i
T (s) 
X
s
Q(s)PT (s)

Y iT (s) + T
i;c
I

;
Ri(s) = PT (s)R
i(s0) all s 6= s0;
where PT and Q are dened as functions of (T cI ;  i(T
c
I )) and are part of a competitive
equilibrium with complete markets and restricted policies. The problem of the union-wide
authority is dened as before. The denitions of a union-wide authority being concerned solely
with insurance, having redistributive motives, and being unnecessary with complete markets
are the natural analogs of those introduced earlier for the economy with no restrictions on
instruments. The second main result of the paper is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. (Complete Markets Obviate the Need for a Fiscal Union Even with
31
Restricted Policies) In an economy with restricted policies, a union-wide scal authority is
unnecessary with complete markets if and only if this authority is concerned solely with in-
surance.
Proof . The proof is essentially identical to that of Proposition 1. The union-wide
authoritys problems under incomplete and complete markets reduce to the same planning
problem, namely, to maximize the objective function of the union subject to the resource
constraints for nontraded goods, (33), the world resource constraints for traded goods, (34),
and the incomplete tax constraints (59). Using the decentralizations of Lemmas 7, 8, and 9, if
the weights that decentralize the incomplete market allocations imply international transfers
fT iI(s;)g that involve no ex-ante transfer of wealth in that
P
sQ(s;)PT (s;)T
i
I(s;) = 0,
then clearly for those same weights, the complete market transfers, fT i;cI ()g, that decentral-
ize these same outcomes necessarily satisfy T i;cI ()
P
sQ(s;)PT (s;) = 0 for all i, so that
T i;cI () = 0 for all i. Q:E:D:
5. When is There a Role for an Activist Union-Wide Authority?
We have shown that for the economies considered, there is no role for an activist union-wide
authority under complete markets when that authority is concerned solely with insurance.
Here we determine conditions under which there might be a role for such an authority.
Our results so far depend on the premise that the union-wide authority has no access
to instruments that national governments do not have available, except for international
transfers, and that the national government of each country is benevolent in that it chooses
policies to maximize the welfare of its citizens. It is primarily the combination of these two
assumptions, along with the assumption that policy makers have commitment and that each
country is small in the world in the relevant sense, which allows us to establish this result. If
we drop any of these assumptions, there may be a role for a union-wide authority, even one
concerned solely with insurance.
We prove this point through three examples. Our rst example shows that if some
countries are constrained in their choice of policy instruments, then there is a role for an
active union-wide authority to levy portfolio taxes. Our second example shows that even
when countries have exible exchange rates, if national governments face constraints on their
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policies, then the union-wide authority typically has an incentive to intervene and impose
portfolio taxes. Finally, our last example shows that if national governments do not maximize
the welfare of their citizens but rather pursue their own self-interests, then there is an incentive
for the union as a whole to delegate the power to set portfolio taxes to the union-wide
authority rather than to the national governments.
A. Portfolio Taxes To Help Policy-Constrained Countries in a Union
Suppose that all countries in one group of the union, N or the North, have access to labor
taxes, nontraded goods taxes, and lump-sum transfers, f iL;  iN(s); T i(s)g for i 2 N , but that
countries in another group, S or the South, have access only to labor taxes and lump-sum
transfers, f iL; T i(s)g for i 2 S. Suppose, moreover, that the union-wide authority, rather
than national governments, can levy taxes on the portfolios of all countries in the union,
f iD(s)g for all i, and when it levies such taxes on a country, it rebates the proceeds to that
country.
Clearly, the restrictions on the scal instruments of Southern countries add incomplete
tax constraints of the form
(64)
Ri(s)
Ri(s0)
=
R0(s)
R0(s0)
for all i 2 S and s 6= s0;
where country 0 is a Southern country. Now, given that the union-wide authority can levy
portfolio taxes f iD(s)g on any country, it is easy to show that the problem of the union-wide
authority reduces to
(65) max
fCiT (s);Li(s)g
Z
i
i
"X
s
(s)U i(Ai(s)Li(s); CiT (s); L
i(s); s)
#
di;
subject to the incomplete tax constraints for the Southern countries in (64) and the world
resource constraints for traded goods. Now consider two pairs of countries, countries i; j 2 N
and k; l 2 S. The rst-order conditions of consumers imply that for all s
(66) iU iT (s) = 
jU jT (s) = 
kUkT (s) + 
k(s) = lU lT (s) + 
l(s);
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where for m = k; l, m 6= 0, and s 6= s0,
(67) m(s) =  m [Am(s)UmN (s) + UmL (s)]
@Rm(s)=@CmT (s)
@Rm(s)=@Lm(s)
:
As we show in the Appendix, the expressions for m(s) for m 6= 0 and s = s0, and those for
m = 0 are similar. The rst-order condition (66) implies there is perfect risk sharing between
any two Northern countries but, because of the incomplete tax constraints, there is imperfect
risk sharing either between a Northern country and a Southern country or between any two
Southern countries. To achieve allocations consistent with (66), the union levies the following
portfolio taxes:
(68)  iD(s) =
8<: 0 for i 2 N  1
i
i(s)
U iT (s)
for i 2 S
:
To see why, note that in the decentralized equilibrium with complete markets, the rst-order
conditions for consumers imply
(69)
U iT (s)[1   iD(s)]
i
=
U0T (s)[1   0D(s)]
0
;
where i is the multiplier on the asset market constraint (2). Here with  iD(s) dened by (68)
and the multiplier i set to 1=i, the decentralized rst-order conditions (69) coincide with
those in the union-wide problem, (66).
Proposition 3A. (Portfolio Taxes to Help Policy-Restricted Countries) In this econ-
omy with restricted policies, a union-wide scal authority concerned solely with insurance
makes no transfers to any country and levies portfolio taxes on policy-restricted Southern
countries solely to help these countries ameliorate their distortions.
Here the union-wide authority simply helps policy-restricted countries by levying a
portfolio tax, which is less powerful than the nontraded goods tax in that it only partially
xes the limited risk sharing implied by the incomplete tax system. The union-wide authority
levies such a tax only because a policy-restricted country is incapable of levying a nontraded
goods tax for itself that would undo the incomplete tax constraint.
34
Notice that here an active role for the union-wide authority is intimately connected
to the countries belonging to a monetary union. To see why, suppose that countries still
belong to a scal union, but that exchange rates between member countries of the union are
exible. In this case, each country i has its own nominal price P iT (s) for its traded goods,
where P iT (s) is the price of traded goods in the local currency of country i in state s. For
this economy with exible exchange rates, note that even if  iN(s) is restricted to zero, the
rst-order condition (5) implies
(70)
Ri(s)
Ri(s0)
=
U iT (s)=U
i
N(s)
U iT (s0)=U
i
N(s0)
= P iT (s);
where we have used the normalization P iT (s0) = 1. But now the right side of (70) varies with i
so that there are no incomplete tax constraints: allocations can be constructed ignoring these
constraints, and then P iT (s) can be chosen so that (70) holds. We summarize this discussion
with a proposition.
Proposition 3B. (Portfolio Taxes To Help Policy-Restricted Countries Unnecessary
with Flexible Exchange Rates) In this economy with restricted policies and exible exchange
rates, a union-wide scal authority concerned solely with insurance neither makes transfers
nor levies portfolio taxes.
This result implies that once we allow for exible exchange rates, there is no need
to levy portfolio taxes. Propositions 3A and 3B might lead one to conjecture that, more
generally, portfolio taxes are necessary only when countries belong to a monetary union and
that these taxes o¤set cross-country externalities. We show in the next section that this
conjecture is incorrect.
B. Portfolio Taxes without a Monetary Union
Here we consider a scal union with exible exchange rates and severe restrictions on the
policies of national governments. Specically, no countries have access to a payroll tax on
labor or nontraded goods taxes, the Northern countries have access to portfolio taxes, whereas
Southern countries do not. The union-wide authority, however, has the ability to levy portfolio
taxes on any country i it chooses. To make our point even starker, imagine that the price of
nontraded goods is exible rather than sticky.
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Here the lack of a payroll tax means that a country no longer has an instrument to
o¤set the monopoly distortion in the labor market. Thus, since nontraded goods prices are
exible, the price setting rule (12) reduces to
(71) P iN(s) =
"
"  1
W i(s)
Ai(s)
;
which adds an extra constraint to the national governmentsproblems. In particular, using
the consumer rst-order condition
 U
i
L(s)
U iN(s)
=
W i(s)
P iN(s)
;
we can rewrite (71) as
(72)  U
i
L(s)
U iN(s)
=
"  1
"
Ai(s):
These monopoly distortion constraints imply that the marginal rate of substitution between
labor and nontraded goods is strictly lower than the marginal rate of transformation between
these variables.
Now, imagine repeating our analysis for this environment. Clearly, the union-wide
authority can simply levy the appropriate portfolio tax on each Southern country and achieve
the same allocations as when all countries have access to and use their portfolio taxes to
maximize their citizenswelfare. We summarize this discussion with the following proposition.
Proposition 4. (Portfolio Taxes to Help Policy-Restricted Countries with Flexible
Exchange Rates) In this economy with restricted policies and exible exchange rates, a union-
wide scal authority concerned solely with insurance is necessary only to levy the portfolio
taxes that policy-restricted countries are unable to levy.
Clearly, this proposition o¤ers a paternalistic view of the union-wide authority: South-
ern countries are unable to carry out desirable policies, so the benevolent union-wide authority
intervenes in their place.
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C. Policy with Self-Interested Governments
In the environments that we have so far considered, except for international transfers, the
equilibrium does not depend on the tier of decision making at which policies are set. For
example, if instead of allowing national governments to set their country-specic scal policies,
we attributed this power to the union-wide authority, then the same equilibrium would arise.
We refer to this property of equilibrium as irrelevance of delegation of authority. The key
assumptions that lead to this result are that the government of each country maximizes the
utility of its citizens and that the union maximizes a weighted average of the utility of the
consumers in each country (along with the assumption of commitment to policy and that each
country is small). Here we consider self-interested governments, namely, those with objective
functions that di¤er from those of their citizens, and show how the delegation of authority
matters for the allocations that can be achieved.
We modify our complete market model as follows. Government i chooses the amount
of nontraded goods, Gi(s), to devote to government spending so that the resource constraints
for nontraded goods are now
(73) CiN(s) +G
i(s)  Ai(s)Li(s) for all s.
Consumer preferences are unchanged; in particular, consumers do not value government
spending. We model a self-interested government by assuming that the preferences of the
government of country i are given by
(74)
X
s
(s)W i(CiN(s); G
i(s); CiT (s); L
i(s); s):
The utility functionW i() of the government is su¢ ciently general so that it can capture many
di¤erent types of self-interest. Here we show how equilibrium is a¤ected by the delegation of
portfolio taxes by considering two environments. In both environments, we assume that the
national government of a country sets nontraded goods taxes, payroll taxes, and domestic
transfers, and the union-wide authority sets international transfers. In the national delegation
model, however, the national governments also set portfolio taxes, whereas in the union
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delegation model, the union-wide authority sets these taxes. We study these alternative
delegation schemes in a complete market version of the model.
National Delegation
We start by characterizing equilibrium at the middle tier. Building on our earlier logic, given
T cI and the strategies of other governments, the problem of country i reduces to
max
fCiN (s);Gi(s);CiT (s);Li(s)g
X
s
(s)W i(CiN(s); G
i(s); CiT (s); L
i(s); s);
subject to (73) and
X
s
Q(s)PT (s)C
i
T (s) 
X
s
Q(s)PT (s)

Y iT (s) + T
i;c
I

;
where the prices PT = PT (T cI ;  i(T
c
I )) and Q = Q(T
c
I ;  i(T
c
I )) are taken as given by this
government. The rst-order conditions for nontraded consumption, labor, and traded goods
can be summarized by
(75) W iN(s) = W
i
G(s);
(76)  W iL(s) = Ai(s)W iN(s);
(77)
(s)W iT (s)
(s0)W iT (s0)
= Q(s)PT (s);
where we have used the normalization that Q(s0) = PT (s0) = 1. Evaluating (77) for country
i and country 0 gives that this constraint implies
(78)
W iT (s)
W iT (s0)
=
W 0T (s)
W 0T (s0)
:
The extra constraints (75), (76), and (78) should be thought of as self-interested governments
constraints. That is, the union-wide authority must respect the incentives of the self-interested
national governments to distort allocations away from those that maximize the utility of their
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consumers. The union-wide authoritys problem is thus
(79) max
fCiN (s);Gi(s);CiT (s);Li(s)g
Z
i
i
"X
s
(s)U i(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s); s)
#
di;
subject to (73), (75), (76), (78), and
Z
i
CiT (s)di 
Z
i
Y iT (s)di.
The constraints in the union-wide authoritys problem capture the unions inability to control
the policies of noncooperative governments.
Union Delegation
We start by characterizing equilibrium at the middle tier. Building on our earlier logic, given
T cI and the strategies of other governments, the problem of country i reduces to
max
fCiN (s);Gi(s);CiT (s);Li(s)g
X
s
(s)W i(CiN(s); G
i(s); CiT (s); L
i(s); s);
subject to (73),
(80)
X
s
Q(s)PT (s)C
i
T (s) 
X
s
Q(s)PT (s)

Y iT (s) + T
i;c
I

;
and
(81)
(s)U iT (s)
(s0)U iT (s0)
=
Q(s)PT (s)
1   iD(s)
for all s 6= s0;
where Q(s)PT (s)=[1    iD(s)] is under the control of the union-wide authority, and we have
used the normalizations Q(s0) = PT (s0) = 1 and  iD(s0) = 0.
Critically, here the union-wide authority can set portfolio taxes in a way that com-
pletely controls the rst-order conditions governing traded goods consumption in each coun-
try. The value of the union-wide authoritys problem here is weakly higher than under the
national delegation scheme.
Proposition 5. (Union Delegation of Portfolio Taxes Preferred) In this economy
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with self-interested governments, the welfare of the union is higher under the union delegation
scheme than under the national delegation scheme.
To prove this result, rst note that the problem of a government under national del-
egation is equivalent to one in which we expand the choice set of the government to include
f iD(s)g and add the consumers rst order condition (81) as a constraint. Then, observe
that in the union delegation problem, the union can always implement the allocations that
arise under national delegation by choosing the same portfolio taxes as governments choose
under national delegation, but can possibly do better.
6. Nontraded Goods Taxes in Practice
As we have shown, when governments have access to nontraded goods taxes, there is no
need to ever levy portfolio taxes under complete markets. Here we argue that, in practice,
governments both have the ability to levy nontraded goods taxes and actually do so. In this
precise sense, our analysis does not provide a strong justication for instituting a new regime
of portfolio taxes within the European Union.
To elaborate, although free-trade agreements in currency areas typically make it very
di¢ cult to di¤erentially tax traded goods, they usually allow some di¤erential tax treatment
of nontraded goods. For example, in May 2009 the Council of the European Commission
adopted a directive (2009/47/EC) that permanently allowed the optional use of reduced rates
for the value-added tax (VAT) on certain labor-intensive local services, including restaurant
services. The rationale was that for such nontraded goods, there is no risk of unfair compe-
tition between service providers in di¤erent member countries. A document of the European
Commission on VAT rates (European Commission (2016)) further provides evidence of how,
in practice, VAT taxes on nontraded goods (and even some traded goods) vary across mem-
ber countries, as is apparent from Figure 1, which shows, for every member country, the
ratio of reduced tax rates over standard tax rates for a variety of nontraded and traded
goods, based on data from the European Commission. (See European Commission (2016).
Note that Directive 2006/112/EC, which Directive 2009/47EC expanded to include labor-
intensive services, allows countries to apply either one or two reduced rates. For countries
with two reduced rates, we select the midpoint between these two rates to compute the ratio
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of the reduced tax rate over the standard tax rate.)
In addition to this varying VAT for nontraded goods, excise taxes on specic goods
also vary signicantly across countries in the European Union. Using beer as a case study
of a specic example of an excise tax, we observe that tax rates on beer indeed di¤er across
member countries. (See Figure 2 for the range of actual VAT rates on beer in 2016 in the
European Union.)
7. Conclusion
We have argued that sophisticated nancial markets obviate the need for a union-wide au-
thority to orchestrate scal transfers across member countries for insurance reasons. This
result holds true even when national governments are subject to additional constraints on
their choice of policy because of the paucity of scal instruments available to them. The key
idea behind these results is that even with restricted scal instruments and noncooperative
governments, no macroeconomic externality arises across countries. If the goal of a union is
to transfer ex-ante wealth from one group of countries to another, however, then an activist
union-wide authority is necessary to carry out such redistribution.
In terms of the optimal delegation of authority, as long as the objective of the non-
cooperative governments of member countries is to maximize the welfare of their citizens,
we show that an irrelevance of delegation of authority result holds. That is, the equilibrium
is unchanged if any of the labor taxes, nontraded goods taxes, or portfolio taxes are del-
egated to the national governments or the union-wide authority. If, instead, governments
pursue self-interested policies, whereas the union-wide authority is benevolent, then it is typ-
ically desirable to delegate relatively more policies to the union-wide authority rather than
to national governments.
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9. Appendix
Here we provide details behind the derivations in the text.
Setup for Proposition 3A. It is convenient to substitute out traded goods prices and write
the incomplete tax constraints as in (64). The union-wide problem is to solve
max
fCiT (s);Li(s)g
Z
i
i
"X
s
(s)U i(Ai(s)Li(s); CiT (s); L
i(s); s)
#
di;
subject to the resource constraints,
Z
i
CiT (s)di 
Z
i
Y iT (s)di for all s,
and the incomplete tax constraints,
R0(s)
R0(s0)
  R
i(s)
Ri(s0)
= 0 for all i 2 S and s 6= s0;
Let (s)(s) and (s)i(s) denote the normalized multipliers on the resource constraints and
the incomplete tax constraints. The rst-order conditions for CiT (s) for i 2 N are
(82) iU iT (s) = (s):
The rst-order conditions for Li(s) for i 2 N are
(83) Ai(s)U iN(s) + U
i
L(s) = 0:
The rst-order conditions for CiT (s) for i 2 S with i 6= 0 and s 6= s0 are
(84) iU iT (s) + 
i(s) = (s);
where i(s0) = 0 and 
i(s) is dened as
(85) i(s) =  i(s)@R
i(s)=@CiT (s)
Ri(s0)
:
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The rst-order condition for CiT (s0) for i 2 S with i 6= 0 has the form of (84) with
(86) i(s0) =  @(1=R
i(s0))
@CiT (s0)
X
s 6=s0
(s)
(s0)
i(s)Ri(s):
The rst-order conditions for C0T (s) and s 6= s0 have the form of (84) with
(87) 0(s) =
1
R0(s0)
@R0(s)
@C0T (s)
Z
j2S
j(s)dj;
whereas the rst-order condition for C0T (s0) has the form of (84) with
(88) 0(s0) =
@(1=R0(s0))
@C0T (s0)
X
s 6=s0

(s)
(s0)
R0(s)
Z
j2S
j(s)dj

;
where 0(s) = 0 for all s. Let H i(s)  i [Ai(s)U iN(s) + U iL(s)] be the Pareto-weighted value
of the net marginal utility of supplying one more unit of time as labor in the nontraded goods
sector. The rst-order condition for Li(s) for i 2 S with i 6= 0 and s 6= s0 is
(89) H i(s) = i(s)
@Ri(s)=@Li(s)
Ri(s0)
;
so that solving for i(s) for i 6= 0 and s 6= s0 gives
(90) i(s) =
H i(s)Ri(s0)
@Ri(s)=@Li(s)
:
Substituting for i(s) into the various expressions for i(s) allows us to express i(s) directly
in terms of allocations. For example, substituting (90) into (85), and using the denition of
H i(s), gives
(91) m(s) =  m [Am(s)UmN (s) + UmL (s)]
@Rm(s)=@CmT (s)
@Rm(s)=@Lm(s)
;
which is expression (67) in the text.
To show how the rst-order conditions for risk sharing can be decentralized, consider
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the competitive equilibrium. The consumers problem is
max
fCiN (s);CiT (s);Li(s);Di(s)g
X
s
(s)U i(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s); s)
subject to
X
s
Q(s)Di(s)  0,
and a budget constraint for each state s,
[1 +  iN(s)]P
i
NC
i
N(s) + PT (s)C
i
T (s)
 W i(s)Li(s)PT (s)

Y iT (s) + T
i(s) + T iI(s)

+ i(s) + [1   iD(s)]Di(s):
Letting i be the multiplier on the asset market constraint and (s)i(s) be the normalized
multiplier on the budget constraint, the rst-order conditions for CiT (s), D
i(s), Li(s), and
CiN(s) are
U iT (s) = 
i(s)PT (s);
iQ(s) = i(s)(s)[1   iD(s)];
 U iL(s) = i(s)W i(s);
U iN(s) = 
i(s)[1 +  iN(s)]P
i
N :
We can manipulate these conditions to obtain
(92)
U iT (s)[1   iD(s)]
i
=
U jT (s)[1   jD(s)]
j
:
Suppose that we are given the allocations from the union-wide problem with weights i and
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the multipliers i(s). If we set i = 1=i and
(93)  iD(s) =  
ii(s)
U iT (s)
for i 2 S and  iD(s) = 0 for i 2 N;
then the risk-sharing rst-order conditions in the union-wide problem and the competitive
equilibrium coincide. Q:E:D:
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Figure	1:	Reduced	VAT	by	Country	
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